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Recent research has provided converging evidence, using multiple tasks, of sensitivity to 
fairness in the second year of life. In contrast, findings in the first year have been mixed, leaving 
it unclear whether young infants possess an expectation of fairness. The present research 
examined the possibility that young infants might expect windfall resources to be divided equally 
between similar recipients but might demonstrate this expectation only under very simple 
conditions. In three violation-of-expectation experiments, 9-month-olds (N = 120) expected an 
experimenter to divide two cookies equally between two animated puppets (1:1), and they 
detected a violation when she divided them unfairly instead (2:0). The same positive result was 
obtained whether the experimenter gave the cookies one by one to the puppets (Experiments 1–
2) or first separated them onto placemats and then gave each puppet a placemat (Experiment 3). 
However, a negative result was obtained when four (as opposed to two) cookies were allocated: 
Infants looked about equally whether they saw a fair (2:2) or an unfair (3:1) distribution 
(Experiment 3). A final experiment revealed that 4-month-olds (N = 40) also expected an 
experimenter to distribute two cookies equally between two animated puppets (Experiment 4). 
Together, these and various control results support two broad conclusions. First, sensitivity to 
fairness emerges very early in life, consistent with claims that an abstract expectation of fairness 
is part of the basic structure of human moral cognition. Second, this expectation can at first be 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, developmental researchers have begun to systematically explore 
the foundations of moral cognition in infancy (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2015; Bloom & Wynn, 
2016; Davidov, Vaish, Knafo-Noam, & Hastings, 2016; Hamlin, 2013b; Liberman, Woodward, 
& Kinzler, 2017; Martin & Olson, 2015; Paulus, 2014; Sommerville & Enright, 2018; Spelke, 
Bernier, & Skerry, 2013; Thomsen & Carey, 2013; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Warneken, 2016). 
In particular, several investigations have sought to uncover the early precursors of adults’ and 
older children’s well-established concern for fairness (e.g., Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevalier, 
2012; Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 
2008; Hamann, Bender, & Tomasello, 2014; McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015; McAuliffe, 
Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017; Ng, Heyman, & Barner, 2011; Olson & Spelke, 2008; 
Renno & Shutts, 2015; Rochat et al., 2009; Shaw & Olson, 2012; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). 
In this report, we focus on infants’ sensitivity to fairness in third-party situations where windfall 
resources are divided, either fairly or unfairly, between two similar recipients. In the next 
sections, we first summarize prior findings from relevant tasks. As will become clear, positive 
results have been obtained in the second year of life with a variety of tasks, providing converging 
evidence of sensitivity to fairness in older infants. In contrast, results in the first year have been 
mixed, leaving it unclear whether young infants possess an expectation of fairness. Next, we 
introduce the present experiments, which sought to reconcile the divergent findings that have 
been obtained with young infants and, in so doing, to ascertain at what age and under what 
conditions sensitivity to fairness can be observed in the first year of life. 
 We reasoned that such evidence would be important for at least three reasons: It would 
constrain theoretical accounts of the mechanisms by which an expectation of fairness first 
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emerges in infancy; it would help identify some of the factors that affect under what conditions 
this expectation is likely to be demonstrated; and it would bear on theoretical accounts of the 
development of fair behaviors (as opposed to fair expectations) in young children, by providing 
further evidence that an early-emerging expectation of fairness is one of the sociomoral 
foundations for this development. 
1.1. Findings with Older Infants 
Evidence of sensitivity to fairness in the second year of life comes from at least three 
different tasks. In one-distributor tasks, a distributor divides resources either equally (equal 
event) or unequally (unequal event) between two similar recipients. The rationale is that if 
infants expect the distributor to act fairly, then they should look longer when this expectation is 
violated in the unequal event. To date, positive results have been obtained in four published 
reports with infants ages 15–19 months (Bian, Sloane, & Baillargeon, 2018; Enright, Gweon, & 
Sommerville, 2017; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012; see 
also Tatone & Csibra, 2018). These reports varied along multiple dimensions, including whether 
the events were videotaped or live; whether the distributor and recipients were humans or 
puppets; whether infants saw a single distribution event followed by still-frame images depicting 
the equal and unequal outcomes or separate distribution events for the two outcomes; and 
whether the allocated resources comprised four items, with 2:2 and 3:1 outcomes (Enright et al., 
2017; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011), or two items, with 1:1 and 2:0 outcomes (Bian et al., 
2018; Sloane et al., 2012). Positive results have also been obtained with infants ages 12–15 
months under limited conditions (Ziv & Sommerville, 2017): When shown a videotaped event in 
which four items were distributed, followed by simultaneous still-frame images depicting equal 
(2:2) and unequal (3:1) outcomes, infants with one or more older siblings looked significantly 
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longer at the unequal outcome. In contrast, infants without siblings tended to look equally at the 
two outcomes, as did 12-month-olds who were shown the two outcomes successively, rather than 
simultaneously (Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013; Tatone & Csibra, 2018). 
In affiliative-preference tasks, one distributor divides resources equally between two 
recipients (fair-distributor event), and another distributor divides resources unequally between 
the same recipients (unfair-distributor event). Next, infants are encouraged to choose between 
the two distributors or to select one of two identical toys offered by the distributors. The 
rationale is that if infants expect a fair distribution, then they may prefer the fair as opposed to 
the unfair distributor, just as they prefer individuals who produce helpful as opposed to harmful 
actions (e.g., Hamlin, 2013a; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). To date, 
positive results have been obtained with 16-month-olds using 2:0 violations (Geraci & Surian, 
2011), with 15-month-olds using 3:1 violations (Burns & Sommerville, 2014), and with 13- and 
17-month-olds using 5:1 violations (Lucca, Pospisil, & Sommerville, 2018). In each report, 
infants were significantly more likely to prefer or endorse the fair over the unfair distributor. 
In reward/punishment tasks, infants first see a fair and an unfair distributor divide 
resources between two recipients, and then the distributors are rewarded or punished for their 
actions. In one report (DesChamps, Eason, & Sommerville, 2015), 13- and 15-month-olds first 
saw videotaped events in which two women distributed four or six items; one woman did so 
fairly, and the other did so unfairly, resulting in 3:1 or 5:1 violations. Next, photos of the two 
women were presented simultaneously, accompanied by a series of seven statements spoken by a 
disembodied voice. In the reward condition, the statements conveyed praise (e.g., “She’s a good 
girl!”, “She did a good job!”); in the punishment condition, they conveyed admonishment (e.g., 
“She’s a bad girl!”, “She did a bad job!”). At 15 months, infants looked significantly longer at 
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the unfair distributor in the reward condition but looked equally at the two distributors in the 
punishment condition. At 13 months, infants looked significantly longer at the unfair distributor 
in the admonishment condition but looked equally at the two distributors in the reward condition. 
One possible interpretation for this complex pattern of findings is that two tendencies contributed 
to infants’ responses. At 15 months, infants tended to look longer at the unfair distributor (due to 
a vigilance or negativity bias; e.g., Baltazar, Shutts, & Kinzler, 2012; Kinzler & Shutts, 2008; 
Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008), and they also tended to look longer at the distributor 
who represented a mismatch with the statements they heard. In the reward condition, these two 
tendencies combined so infants looked longer at the unfair distributor, who inexplicably seemed 
to be receiving lavish praise. In the punishment condition, these two tendencies cancelled each 
other, resulting in equal looking times at the two distributors. At 13 months, infants had the same 
tendencies, with one exception: Perhaps due to their poorer linguistic skills, infants tended to 
look longer at the distributor who represented a match with the statements they heard (for other 
language experiments showing novelty vs. familiarity preferences depending on age or stimulus 
complexity, see e.g., Chambers, Onishi, & Fisher, 2011; Ferry, Hespos, & Waxman, 2010). In 
the punishment condition, the two tendencies combined to result in longer looking at the unfair 
distributor, who was being appropriately admonished for her actions. In the reward condition, the 
two tendencies cancelled each other, resulting in equal looking times at the two distributors. 
1.2. Findings with Younger Infants 
Sensitivity to fairness in the first year of life has been examined using the same types of 
tasks as with older infants. Reports using one-distributor tasks have yielded mixed results. When 
tested with computer-animated events showing a two-item distribution, 10-month-olds looked 
significantly longer at the unequal (2:0) than at the equal (1:1) event (Meristo, Strid, & Surian, 
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2016). However, when tested with videotaped events showing a four-item distribution, with the 
final still-frame images depicting the unequal (3:1) and equal (2:2) outcomes presented 
simultaneously, 9- and 6-month-olds tended to look equally at the two outcomes, and this was 
true whether or not they had older siblings (Ziv & Sommerville, 2017).  
A report using an affiliative-preference task also yielded negative results. After watching 
computer-animated events in which a fair and an unfair distributor divided two items between 
two recipients, 16-month-olds significantly preferred the fair over the unfair distributor (“Which 
one do you want? Pick it up!”), but 10-month-olds chose randomly between them (Geraci & 
Surian, 2011). 
Finally, reports using reward/punishment tasks have yielded inconsistent results. In one 
report (Meristo & Surian, 2013), 10-month-olds first saw computer-animated events in which a 
fair and an unfair distributor divided two items between two recipients; a bystander either 
observed these distributions (informed condition) or was prevented from doing so by a partial 
barrier (uninformed condition). Next, the bystander gave a reward (a strawberry) to either the fair 
or the unfair distributor.1 Infants in the informed condition looked significantly longer when the 
bystander rewarded the unfair as opposed to the fair distributor, whereas infants in the 
uninformed condition looked equally at the two events, suggesting that they understood that the 
bystander lacked the necessary information to distinguish between the distributors. However, in 
additional experiments (Meristo & Surian, 2013, 2014), 10-month-olds also looked significantly 
longer when a newcomer who was absent during the distributors’ actions, and therefore should 
have been uninformed, (a) rewarded the unfair as opposed to the fair distributor or (b) punished 
                                                 
1 Although Meristo and Surian (2013) described their task as a reward task, it could also be construed as an 
affiliative-preference task: Perhaps infants simply expected the bystander to prefer and approach the fair over the 
unfair distributor. In this view, the same results would have been obtained had the bystander simply approached 
each distributor, without giving them a strawberry (for evidence that young infants both form affiliative preferences 
and expect others to share these preferences, see Hamlin et al., 2007). 
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the unfair as opposed to the fair distributor (e.g., by taking away a strawberry). 
 
1.3. Two Hypotheses 
 The results reviewed in the preceding sections indicate that by the second year of life, 
infants expect a distributor to divide resources fairly between two similar recipients: They detect 
a violation when shown unequal distributions, they prefer fair over unfair distributors, and they 
selectively associate praise with fair distributors and admonishment with unfair distributors. In 
contrast, findings with infants in the first year of life were mixed, leaving it unclear at what age 
and under what conditions young infants first demonstrate an expectation of fairness. In 
particular, consider the divergent results from the one-distributor tasks of Ziv and Sommerville 
(2017) and Meristo et al. (2016). At least two hypotheses can be offered for these conflicting 
results; these hypotheses focus on different procedural differences between the two tasks and 
invoke different mechanisms to explain the emergence of fairness in infancy. 
 One (shift) hypothesis focuses on the different ages tested in the two tasks: Ziv and 
Sommerville (2017) obtained negative results with 6- and 9-month-olds, while Meristo et al. 
(2016) obtained positive results with 10-month-olds. According to this hypothesis, an important 
developmental shift takes place at about 10 months of age that leads to the acquisition of 
expectations about fairness. This shift occurs largely through socialization processes: As infants 
interact with others (e.g., parents, other caregivers, siblings) in their everyday social 
environments, they come to learn that resources are typically distributed equally between similar 
recipients (e.g., Bloom & Wynn, 2016; Sommerville et al., 2013; Ziv & Sommerville, 2017). 
From this perspective, it would make sense that even at 12–15 months of age, infants with older 
siblings were more likely to demonstrate sensitivity to fairness than were infants without siblings 
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(Ziv & Sommerville, 2017). The presence of older siblings would result in more opportunities to 
learn about fairness and hence would “spur the developmental shift in infants’ fairness 
expectations” (Ziv & Sommerville, p. 1044).  
 The other (continuity) hypothesis focuses on the different fairness violations used in the 
two tasks: Ziv and Sommerville (2017) obtained negative results with a 3:1 violation, while 
Meristo et al. (2016) obtained positive results with a 2:0 violation. According to this explanation, 
an abstract expectation of fairness emerges very early in life, as part of the basic structure of 
human moral cognition (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2015; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Dawes 
et al., 2007; Graham et al., 2013; Jackendoff, 2007; Premack, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shweder, 
Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). However, this expectation can at first be demonstrated only 
under limited conditions, which gradually broaden with experience. For example, it might be that 
young infants are initially able to process distributions of two items, but not distributions of four 
or more items; that they are initially able to detect qualitative violations, in which one recipient 
gets something and the other gets nothing (e.g., a 2:0 or a 4:0 violation), but not quantitative 
violations, in which both recipients get something but in differing amounts (e.g., a 3:1 or a 7:1 
violation); or that they are initially able to detect quantitative violations when the numerical 
distance between the amounts allocated to the two recipients is larger (e.g., a 7:1 violation), but 
not when it is smaller (e.g., a 3:1 violation). Regardless of which of these possibilities turns out 
to be correct (we return to them in the General Discussion), the main thrust of the continuity 
hypothesis is that an expectation of fairness emerges very early in life, as part of the “first draft” 
of moral cognition (Graham et al., 2013). 
 Which of the two preceding hypotheses is more likely to be correct? Do infants acquire 
an expectation of fairness toward the end of the first year of life, as the shift hypothesis suggests, 
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or is this expectation present beginning early in the first year but observable only under limited 
conditions, as the continuity hypothesis suggests? The present research sought to answer these 
questions.  
1.4. The Present Research 
According to the continuity hypothesis, an expectation of fairness is present early in life 
but can initially be observed only under limited conditions. In particular, infants may initially be 
able to detect simple 2:0 violations, but not more challenging 3:1 violations. The present 
experiments tested three predictions from this hypothesis, using one-distributor tasks. A first 
prediction was that 9-month-olds would give evidence of sensitivity to fairness if presented with 
a 2:0 violation. Experiments 1 and 2 both tested this prediction, using slightly different 
procedures that made possible different control conditions. A second prediction, tested in 
Experiment 3, was that 9-month-olds would succeed in detecting a 2:0 but not a 3:1 violation. 
Finally, a third prediction was that infants younger than 9 months might also succeed in detecting 
a 2:0 violation. To evaluate this prediction, Experiment 4 tested 4-month-olds using a design 
similar to that of Experiment 1. 
We reasoned that finding the predicted results in all four experiments would (a) confirm 
the positive findings of Meristo et al. (2016) with a 2:0 violation and extend them to younger 
infants, (b) confirm the negative findings of Ziv and Sommerville (2017) with a 3:1 violation, 







CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1 
 Experiment 1 examined whether 9-month-old infants would succeed in detecting a 2:0 
fairness violation in a one-distributor task. Infants were assigned to an experimental or an 
inanimate-control condition (N = 20 in each condition of this report) and saw live events 
(adapted from Sloane et al., 2012) in which a female experimenter divided two cookies either 
fairly or unfairly between two puppets. Each infant sat on a parent’s lap facing a large puppet-
stage apparatus; at the start of each trial, a supervisor lifted a curtain at the front of the apparatus. 
In each condition, infants received one familiarization trial and one test trial, and each trial had 
an initial phase and a final phase.  
 The familiarization trial served to introduce the puppets. At the start of the trial in the 
experimental condition (Fig. 1A), two identical penguin puppets (operated by a hidden female 
assistant) came through small windows in the back wall of the apparatus.  Each penguin had a 
small placemat in front of them. Throughout the initial (12-s) phase of the trial, the penguins 
tilted alternately from left to right; during the latter phase, the penguins paused standing upright, 
and infants watched this paused scene until the end of the trial (for criteria, see Procedure 
section). 
During the initial (26-s) phase of the test trial, the penguins first tilted left to right then 
turned to the right as a female experimenter entered the stage by opening a curtained window on 
the right wall of the apparatus. The experimenter brought in two identical cookies on a plate and 
placed the plate on the apparatus floor. She then announced, “I have cookies!”, and the penguins 
responded excitedly, “Yay, yay!” (two hidden female assistants spoke in unison). Next, the 
experimenter placed both cookies one-by-one on the placemat in front of one penguin 
(counterbalanced across infants); in the unequal event; gave one cookie to each penguin in the 
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equal event. Finally, the experimenter left taking the empty plate and closing the curtain at her 
window. The penguins then looked down at the outcome of the distribution on their placemats 
and paused. During the final phase of the trial, infants watched this paused scene until the trial 
ended. We reasoned that if 9-month-olds expected the equal distribution of the cookies between 
the two recipient puppets and detected a violation in the unequal event, then they should look 
significantly longer if shown the unequal event as opposed to the equal event. 
 The inanimate-control condition (Fig. 1B) provided a control for low-level 
interpretations of the positive results in the experimental condition, such as a baseline preference 
for displays involving two cookies closer to each other in proximity or asymmetrical displays in 
general. In previous experiments, researchers have consistently found that infants hold no 
expectation about how a distributor will divide windfall resources between two inanimate 
entities, suggesting that they appropriately restrict their expectation of fairness to animate entities 
(e.g., Meristo et al., 2016; Sloane et al., 2012; Ziv & Sommerville, 2017). In line with these 
findings, infants saw events similar to that of in the experimental condition with two exceptions:  
The penguins neither moved nor talked (and were therefore inanimate). Because the penguins 
gave no evidence of self-propulsion or agency (e.g., Setoh, Wu, Baillargeon, & Gelman, 2013), 
we predicted that infants would view them as inanimate penguin-shaped toys, would hold no 
expectations about how the experimenter would divide the cookies between them, and hence 
would look about equally at the equal and unequal events. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 40 healthy term 9-month-olds, 20 male (range = 8 months, 9 days to 10 
months, 8 days, M = 9 months, 10 days). Another 10 infants were excluded, 7 because they 
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looked for the maximum time allowed in the test trial, 2 (in the experimental condition) because 
their test looking times were over 3 standard deviations from the condition mean, and 1 because 
the infant was inattentive. Half of the infants were randomly assigned to the experimental 
condition, and half to the inanimate-control condition; within each condition, half of the infants 
saw the equal event, and half saw the unequal event.  
The infants’ names in this and the following experiments were obtained from a 
university-maintained database of parents interested in participating in child-development 
research. Parents were offered either a small gift (e.g., a children’s book) or reimbursement for 
their travel expenses but were not otherwise compensated for their participation. Each infant’s 
parent gave written informed consent, and the protocol was approved by the Institutional Review 
Board at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
2.1.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus was a puppet stage (201.5 cm high  102 cm wide  58 cm deep) with a 
large window (56 cm  95 cm) in its front side facing the baby; in between trials, the supervisor 
lowered an ivory colored curtain to occlude the front window. The side walls inside the 
apparatus were painted white, while the back wall and stage floor were covered with ivory 
colored adhesive paper. 
The experimenter wore a dark green shirt, knelt at a window (51 cm  38 cm) covered 
with a white curtain in the right side of the apparatus. The experimenter opened the white curtain 
to enter the stage and or closed it to exit it. A larger white curtain behind the puppet stage served 
as background to hide the experiment room. Throughout the test trial, the experimenter looked at 
the puppets and the objects involved naturally while never making eye contact with the infants 
watching the events. 
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The two penguins were identical puppets (about 22 cm  12 cm  9 cm at their largest 
points). Each penguin was made of black, white and orange fabric. The penguins came through 
the two small windows on the back wall (each 20 cm  12.5 cm and covered with beige spandex 
fabric) located 5 cm above the floor. In the experimental condition, an assistant sat behind the 
back wall and manipulated the penguins; in the inanimate-control condition, the penguins rested 
upright on hidden wooden posts. On the stage floor, placed in front of each penguin was a 
rectangular white placemat (0.5 cm  20 cm  13 cm). The two cookies were plastic vanilla 
sandwich cookies (each about 1 cm  3 cm  7 cm), that were brought in by the experimenter on 
an ivory colored ceramic plate (2.5 cm  20 cm in diameter).  
To aid the experimenter and the assistants follow the events’ scripts, a metronome beat 
softly once per second. During each testing session, one camera captured the events taking place 
on the stage, and another camera captured the infant’s face. The two images combined on a 
screen behind the stage, were checked by the supervisor to verify that the events correctly 
followed their scripts. Recorded sessions were also checked off-line for experimenter accuracy. 
2.1.3 Procedure 
Each infant sat centered on a parent's lap in front of the stage. The parents were instructed 
to keep the interaction with their infant to a minimum and to keep their eyes closed during the 
test trial. Each infant's looking behavior was recorded by two hidden observers who watched the 
infant through eyeholes in grey, cloth-covered panels on each side of the apparatus.  The 
observers were blind to the condition and event presented to the infants and the events were 
blocked from their viewpoint throughout the experiment.2 Each observer held a game controller 
                                                 
2 At the end of the test trial in each experiment, the primary observer was asked to guess whether the infant had seen 
an unequal or an equal event during the trial. Across Experiments 1–4, the primary observer guessed correctly for 
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linked to a computer to record the infants’ looking behavior.  They pressed a button on the game 
controller when the infant looked at the event and released the button when they looked away. 
Looking times during the initial and final phases of each trial were computed separately, utilizing 
the primary observer's responses. Interobserver agreement during the final phase of each trial 
was measured as the proportion of 100-ms intervals in which the observers agreed about whether 
the infant was watching at the event; agreement was calculated for all 40 infants and averaged 
93% per trial per infant.  
Infants were highly attentive during the initial phases of both the familiarization and test 
trials: They, on average, watched, 93% of each initial phase. The final phase of each trial ended 
when infants (a) looked away for 2 consecutive seconds after having looked for at least 5 
(familiarization) or 8 (test) cumulative seconds or (b) looked for a maximum of 45 cumulative 
seconds. A slightly longer minimum look was used in the test trial to give infants the opportunity 
to compare and evaluate the two puppets’ allocations before the trial could end.  
Finally, preliminary analyses of the test data revealed no significant interaction of 
condition and event with infant's sex or with which puppet received the first cookie, both Fs(1, 
32) ≤ 1.41, p ≥ .244; the data were therefore collapsed across the latter two factors in subsequent 
analyses. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
Looking times during the final phase of the familiarization trial were subjected to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with condition (experimental or inanimate-control) as a between-
subject factor. This effect was not significant, F(1, 38) = 0.22, p > .250, suggesting that infants in 
the experimental (M = 18.34, SD = 12.99) and inanimate-control (M = 16.38, SD = 13.27) 
                                                                                                                                                             
20/40, 20/38 (the observer failed to make a guess for two infants), 20/40, and 20/40 infants, respectively, all ps > 
.250 (cumulative binomial probability). 
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conditions tended to look equally at the puppets (for data from all experiments, see Dataset in 
Supplementary Online Material). 
Looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 2) were subjected to an 
ANOVA with condition (experimental or inanimate-control) and event (unequal or equal) as 
between-subject factors. The only significant effect was the Condition  Event interaction, F(1, 
36) = 5.19, p = .029, ηp
2 = 0.13 (no such interaction was found in the familiarization trial, F(1, 
36) = 0.01, p > .250). Planned comparisons revealed that infants in the experimental condition 
looked significantly longer at the unequal (M = 23.04, SD = 8.11) than at the equal (M = 14.05, 
SD = 4.49) event, F(1, 36) = 6.85,  p = .013, Cohen's d = 1.37, whereas infants in the inanimate-
control condition looked about equally at the unequal (M = 14.28, SD = 6.36) and equal (M = 
16.35, SD = 10.46) events, F(1, 36) = 0.36, p > .250, d = 0.24. Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests confirmed the results of the experimental (Z = 2.61, p = .009) and inanimate-control (Z 
= -0.26, p > .250) conditions. 
Infants expected the experimenter to divide the two cookies equally between the two 
animated penguins, but they held no particular expectation about how the experimenter would 
divide the cookies between the two inanimate penguins. Together, these results provided 
evidence that 9-month-old infants already expect a distributor to divide two items equally 








CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 had two goals: One was to confirm the positive result of the experimental 
condition in Experiment 1, and the other was to address a possible alternative interpretation of 
this result. Specifically, infants might have looked longer at the unequal event not because they 
expected a distributor to divide windfall resources equally between similar individuals, but 
because they expected similar individuals to have similar numbers of objects (e.g., one cookie 
each; Welder & Graham, 2001). To rule out this alternative interpretation, infants in Experiment 
2 were assigned to a cover-experimental or a cover-control condition. In the cover-experimental 
condition, the experimenter first removed covers placed over the penguins’ placemats and then 
proceeded to distribute the two cookies, as in Experiment 1. The cover-control condition 
(adapted from Sloane et al., 2012) was identical except that the experimenter no longer brought 
in and distributed the two cookies: In each event, she simply removed the covers to reveal the 
cookies already resting on the penguins’ placemats. If infants merely expected similar puppets to 
have similar numbers of items, then infants in both the cover-experimental and cover-control 
conditions should look significantly longer at the unequal than at the equal event. However, if 
infants expected the experimenter to act fairly when distributing the cookies to the puppets, but 
held no particular expectation about her actions when she simply revealed the cookies, then 
infants in the cover-experimental condition should look significantly longer at the unequal than 
at the equal event, whereas infants in the cover-control condition should look about equally at the 
two events. 
Infants in the cover-experimental condition (Fig. 3A) first received the same 
familiarization trial as in the experimental condition of Experiment 1, with the animated 
penguins dancing from side to side. Infants then received one test trial. At the start of the initial 
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(42-s) phase, opaque rectangular covers rested in front of the penguins, over their empty 
placemats; the penguins (who were clearly visible above their covers) danced until the 
experimenter opened her window. The penguins then watched as the experimenter grasped one 
of the covers, lifted it, removed it from the apparatus through her window, and then repeated 
these actions with the other cover. Next, the experimenter brought in the plate with the two 
cookies, and the events proceeded exactly as in Experiment 1. Infants saw either the equal or the 
unequal event; for each event, which cover was removed first and which penguin received the 
first cookie were counterbalanced across infants.  
The cover-control condition (Fig. 3B) was identical with the following exceptions: At the 
start of the (26-s) initial phase of the test trial, the cookies were already on the penguins’ 
placemats, hidden under the covers. The experimenter removed the covers, one at a time, to 
reveal the cookies; in the unequal event, both cookies were in front of the same penguin; in the 
equal event, one cookie was in front of each penguin. The experimenter then left, and the 
penguins looked down at their placemats and paused. The experimenter did not speak in this 
condition, but the penguins did greet her (“Yay, yay!”) when she arrived. Which cover was 
removed first and which penguin had both cookies in the unequal event were counterbalanced 
across infants.  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 40 healthy term 9-month-olds, 18 male (range = 8 months, 1 day to 10 
months, 8 days, M = 9 months, 2 days). Another 12 infants were excluded, 6 because they looked 
for the maximum time allowed in the test trial, 4 because they were fussy (2), distracted (1), or 
subjected to parental interference (1), and 2 (one in each condition) because their test looking 
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times were over 3 standard deviations from the condition mean. Half of the infants were 
randomly assigned to the cover-experimental condition, and half to the cover-control condition; 
within each condition, half of the infants saw the equal event, and half saw the unequal event. 
3.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1, with the addition of 
two identical tan rectangular covers (each 10 cm  22.5 cm  15.5 cm, with a wooden knob at 
the top). The procedure was also identical to that in Experiment 1. Infants were highly attentive 
during the initial phases of the familiarization and test trials; across conditions, they looked, on 
average, for 97% of each initial phase. Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test 
trial was calculated for all 40 infants and averaged 94% per trial per infant. Finally, preliminary 
analyses of the test data revealed no significant interaction of condition and event with infant's 
sex, which cover was removed first, or which penguin received the first cookie (cover-
experimental) or had both cookies (cover-control), all Fs(1, 32) ≤ 1.64, ps ≥ .0.209; the data were 
therefore collapsed across these latter three factors in subsequent analyses. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
Looking times during the final phase of the familiarization trial were analyzed by means 
of an ANOVA with condition (cover-experimental or cover-control) as a between-subject factor. 
This effect was not significant, F(1, 38) = 0.30, p > .250, suggesting that infants in the cover-
experimental (M = 20.52, SD = 12.70) and cover-control (M = 18.17, SD = 14.64) conditions 
tended to look equally at the puppets.  
Looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 2) were subjected to an 
ANOVA with condition (cover-experimental or cover-control) and test event (unequal or equal) 
as between-subjects factors. The only significant effect was the Condition  Event interaction, 
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F(1, 36) = 6.40, p = .016, ηp
2 = 0.15 (no such interaction was found in the familiarization trial, 
F(1, 36) = 0.34, p > .250). Planned comparisons revealed that infants in the cover-experimental 
condition looked significantly longer at the unequal (M = 22.61, SD = 8.66) than at the equal (M 
= 14.56, SD = 1.98) event, F(1, 36) = 7.26,  p = .011, d = 1.28, whereas infants in the cover-
control condition looked about equally at the unequal (M = 14.13, SD = 6.44) and equal (M = 
16.77, SD = 7.63) events, F(1, 36) = 0.78, p > .250, d = 0.37. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirmed 
the results of the cover-experimental (Z = 2.04, p = .041) and cover-control (Z = -0.87, p > .250) 
conditions. 
When the experimenter brought in and distributed the two cookies, infants expected her 
to do so fairly, and they detected a violation when she instead gave both cookies to the same 
puppet. However, when the experimenter simply lifted covers to reveal the cookies already 
resting on the puppets’ placemats, infants held no particular expectation about how many cookies 
each puppet would have. Infants thus bring to bear considerations of fairness when resources are 
distributed between similar individuals, but not when resources already in individuals’ 











CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 3 
 According to the continuity hypothesis, the discrepancy between the positive findings of 
Meristo et al. (2016) and the negative findings of Ziv and Sommerville (2017) was not due to 
due to the fact that the former tested 10-month-olds and the latter 9-month-olds; rather, it was 
due to the fact that the former used a simple 2:0 violation and the latter a more challenging 3:1 
violation. Experiments 1 and 2 provided initial evidence for this hypothesis by showing that 9-
month-olds could indeed detect a 2:0 fairness violation. Building on these results, Experiment 3 
sought to confirm that 9-month-olds would detect a 2:0 violation, but not a 3:1 violation. 
  Infants were assigned to a two-item or a four-item condition. To equate the 
experimenter’s actions toward the recipients in the two conditions, a new distribution procedure 
was used that was adapted from the work of Sommerville and her colleagues (e.g., Burns & 
Sommerville, 2014; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Rather than distributing each cookie one by 
one, the experimenter divided the cookies between two placemats and then slid one placemat 
toward each puppet. With this mode of distribution, differences between the two conditions (or 
between the two events within each condition) could not be attributed to differences in how 
many times the experimenter approached or interacted with each puppet. 
Infants in both conditions first received the same familiarization trial as in the 
experimental condition of Experiment 1, with one exception: The placemats now rested back to 
back, 2.5 cm apart, at the front of the apparatus, centered between the two puppets in the back 
wall. Infants then received one test trial. At the start of the initial (33-s) phase in the two-item 
condition (Fig 4A), the penguins danced until the experimenter opened her window. As before, 
the experimenter brought in a plate with two cookies and announced, “I have cookies!”, to which 
the penguins responded, “Yay, yay!”. Next, the experimenter put one cookie on the back 
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placemat and then one cookie on the front placemat (equal event), or she put both cookies, one at 
a time, on the back placemat (unequal event); the experimenter always started with the back 
placemat to make it easier for infants to see what was put on each placemat. The experimenter 
then paused briefly, to allow infants to compare the two placemats. Finally, the experimenter slid 
the back placemat toward one puppet and then the front placemat toward the other puppet. The 
experimenter then left, and the puppets looked down at their placemats and paused, as in 
Experiment 1. Each infant saw either the equal or the unequal event; in each event, which 
penguin received the back placemat was counterbalanced across infants. The four-item condition 
(Fig. 4B) was identical with two exceptions. First, the experimenter brought in four cookies and 
either put two on each placemat (equal event) or put three on the back placemat and one on the 
front placemat (unequal event). Second, the initial phase of the test trial was extended from 33 to 
39 s, as it took the experimenter slightly longer the divide four as opposed to two cookies. 
Based on the positive results of Experiments 1 and 2, we predicted that the 9-month-olds 
in the two-item condition would again detect the fairness violation in the unequal event and 
hence would look significantly longer if shown that event as opposed to the equal event. In 
contrast, based on the negative results of Ziv and Sommerville (2017) with 9-month-olds, we 
predicted that infants in the four-item condition would be unable to detect the fairness violation 
they were shown and hence would tend to look equally at the unequal and equal events. 
Together, these results would provide strong evidence that young infants do expect fairness but 
are initially very limited in the violations they can detect. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 40 healthy term 9-month-olds, 17 male (range = 8 months, 1 day to 9 
months, 29 days, M = 9 months, 1 day). Another 4 infants were excluded, 2 because they looked 
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for the maximum time allowed in the test trial, 1 (in the two-item condition) because the infant’s 
test looking time was over 3 standard deviations from the condition mean, and 1 because the 
infant was distracted. Half of the infants were randomly assigned to the two-item condition, and 
half to the four-item condition; within each condition, half of the infants saw the equal event, and 
half saw the unequal event. 
4.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1, with two exceptions: 
Four cookies were used in the four-item condition and felt was attached to the undersides of the 
placemats so that they slid quietly across the apparatus. The procedure was also identical to that 
of Experiment 1. Infants were highly attentive during the initial phases of the familiarization and 
test trials; across conditions, they looked, on average, for 96% of each initial phase. Interobserver 
agreement during the final phase of each trial was calculated for all 40 infants and averaged 94% 
per trial per infant. Finally, preliminary analyses of the test data revealed no significant 
interaction of condition and event with infant's sex or with which penguin received the back 
placemat, both Fs(1, 32) ≤ 1.61, ps ≥ .213; the data were therefore collapsed across these latter 
two factors in subsequent analyses. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
Looking times during the final phase of the familiarization trial were subjected to an 
ANOVA with condition (two- or four-item) as a between-subject factor. This effect was not 
significant, F(1, 38) = 1.54, p = .222, suggesting that infants in the two-item (M = 15.80, SD = 
8.58) and four-item (M = 20.22, SD = 13.40) conditions tended to look equally at the puppets. 
Looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 2) were subjected to an 
ANOVA with condition (two- or four-item) and test event (unequal or equal) as between-subject 
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factors. The only significant effect was the Condition  Event interaction, F(1, 36) = 4.59, p = 
.039, ηp
2 = 0.11 (no such interaction was found in the familiarization trial, F(1, 36) = 1.55, p = 
.221). Planned comparisons revealed that infants in the two-item condition looked significantly 
longer at the unequal (M = 22.77, SD = 9.09) than at the equal (M = 15.37, SD = 4.79) event, 
F(1, 36) = 4.83, p = .035, d = 1.01, whereas infants in the four-item condition looked about 
equally at the unequal (M = 17.76, SD = 6.76) and equal (M = 20.57, SD = 8.70) events, F(1, 36) 
= 0.70, p > .250, d = 0.36. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirmed the results of the two-item (Z = 
2.04, p = .041) and four-item (Z = -0.49, p > .250) conditions. 
Consistent with the positive findings of Experiments 1 and 2, infants in the two-item 
condition detected a fairness violation when one puppet received a placemat with two cookies 
and the other puppet received a placemat with no cookies. Moreover, consistent with the 
negative findings of Ziv and Sommerville (2017), infants in the four-item condition failed to 
detect a violation when one puppet received a placemat with three cookies while the other puppet 
received a placemat with one cookie. Because the experimenter’s actions were identical in the 
two conditions (she simply slid one placemat toward each puppet), these diverging results most 
likely stemmed from the numbers of items involved in each violation: Infants were able to detect 
a 2:0, but not a 3:1, violation. This last finding is particularly striking because the two placemats 
were initially positioned back-to-back at the front of the apparatus, making it easy for infants to 
determine via one-to-one correspondence that the back placemat had two more cookies than the 
front placemat. We return in the General Discussion to possible reasons why infants still failed to 





CHAPTER 5: OVERALL ANALYSES 
To explore two additional variables, we pooled the test data from the experimental 
(Experiment 1), cover-experimental (Experiment 2), and two-item (Experiment 3) conditions 
into a combined-experimental condition (N = 60); as can be seen in Fig. 2, infants in all three 
conditions looked significantly longer if shown the unequal as opposed to the equal event. The 
first variable we examined was whether test responses differed between infants with or without 
older siblings. Recall that Ziv and Sommerville (2017) found that at 12–15 months, infants with 
siblings looked longer at a 3:1 than at a 2:2 outcome when both were displayed simultaneously, 
whereas infants without siblings looked about equally at the two outcomes. In the combined-
experimental condition, 30 infants had one or more siblings, and 30 did not. Their looking times 
were compared by means of an ANOVA with sibling (yes or no) and event (unequal or equal) as 
between-subject factors. The main effect of sibling was not significant, nor was the Sibling  
Event interaction, both Fs(1, 56) ≤ 1.20, ps > .250. The only significant effect was the main 
effect of event, F(1, 56) = 22.76, p < .0001, ηp
2 = 0.29. Planned comparisons indicated that both 
infants without siblings, F(1, 56) = 7.90, p = .007, and infants with siblings, F(1, 56) = 15.49, p 
= .0002, looked significantly longer if shown the unequal as opposed to the equal event (without 
siblings: unequal, M = 23.04, SD = 7.97, equal, M = 16.36, SD = 3.14; with siblings: unequal, M 
= 22.54, SD = 9.01, equal, M = 13.18, SD = 3.90). Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirmed the 
positive results obtained with the infants without siblings (Z = 2.33, p = .020) and with siblings 
(Z = 3.01, p = .003). 
 The second variable we explored was age. Since infants in the combined-experimental 
condition varied in age from 8 to 10 months, we divided them via a median split into a younger, 
8-month-old group (N = 30, range = 8 months, 1 day to 9 months, 3 days, M = 8 months, 17 
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days) and an older, 9-month-old group (N = 30, range = 9 months, 7 days to 10 months, 8 days, 
M = 9 months, 18 days). This analysis was identical to that above except that sibling was 
replaced by age (8 or 9 months) as factor. The main effect of age was not significant, nor was the 
Age  Event interaction, both Fs(1, 56) ≤ 0.10, ps > .250. Once again, only the main effect of 
event was significant, F(1, 56) = 22.09, p < .0001, ηp
2 = 0.28. Planned comparisons indicated 
that both 8-month-olds, F(1, 56) = 12.62, p = .0008, and 9-month-olds, F(1, 56) = 9.58, p = 
.0031, looked significantly longer if shown the unequal as opposed to the equal event (8 months: 
unequal, M = 22.98, SD = 9.36, equal, M = 14.24, SD = 3.76; 9 months: unequal, M = 22.55, SD 
= 6.87, equal, M = 14.94, SD = 4.00). Wilcoxon rank-sum tests confirmed the positive results 
obtained with the 8-month-olds (Z = 2.67, p = .008) and 9-month-olds (Z = 2.84, p = .005). 
In sum, infants in Experiments 1–3 were able to detect the simple 2:0 violation they were 














CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENT 4 
As predicted by the continuity hypothesis, the 8- and 9-month-olds in Experiments 1–3 
could detect a simple 2:0 fairness violation but not a more challenging 3:1 fairness violation. 
Experiment 4 examined whether infants younger than 8 months might also be able to detect a 2:0 
violation. Four-month-olds were tested using a design similar to that of Experiment 1; half of the 
infants were assigned to the experimental condition (Fig. 5A), and half to the inanimate-control 
condition (Fig. 5B).  
 To make our events more appropriate for these very young subjects, we introduced three 
modifications. First, we used Elmo puppets, whose bright red color and large eyes seemed likely 
to capture the attention of 4-month-olds. Second, we gave infants two familiarization trials. The 
first served to introduce the puppets and was similar to that in Experiment 1; in the experimental 
condition, the puppets danced happily from side to side, and in the inanimate-control condition, 
they remained stationary. The second trial served to introduce the experimenter. During the (6-s) 
initial phase, she opened her window, deposited her plate of cookies on the apparatus floor, and 
then paused for the final phase of the trial (the puppets were absent in this trial). Third, during 
the final phase of the test trial in the experimental condition, the puppets moved slightly from 
side to side while bent over their placemats (pilot data suggested that the sudden change from 
moving to still Elmos seemed to be upsetting for some infants; this was not an issue in the 
inanimate-control condition because the Elmos were inanimate throughout the trials). 
We reasoned that if 4-month-olds already possess an expectation of fairness and can 
detect simple 2:0 fairness violations, then infants in the experimental condition should look 
significantly longer if shown the unequal as opposed to the equal event, whereas infants in the 





Participants were 40 healthy full-term 4-month-olds, 20 male (range = 3 months, 21 days 
to 5 months, 18 days, M = 4 months, 21 days). Another 10 infants were excluded, 6 because they 
looked for the maximum time allowed in the test trial, 2 because they were distracted or 
inattentive, and 2 (in the experimental condition) because their test looking times were over 3 
standard deviations from the condition mean. Half of the infants were randomly assigned to the 
experimental condition, and half to the inanimate-control condition; within each condition, half 
of the infants saw the equal event, and half saw the unequal event 
6.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1 except that the penguin 
puppets were replaced by two identical Elmo puppets (about 25 cm  25 cm  10 cm at the 
largest points). Each puppet was made of red, furry fabric, had a large head, large black and 
white eyes, and an orange nose. The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1, with two 
exceptions. First, as noted earlier, infants received two familiarization trials, one to introduce the 
puppets and then one to introduce the experimenter. Second, a slightly different look-away 
criterion was used to end the final phase of each trial. Each trial now ended when the infant 
looked away for 1 cumulative second, as opposed to 2 cumulative seconds. This adjustment was 
necessary because infants tended to look more continuously at the events, either because of their 
very young age, because they found the Elmo puppets highly eye-catching, or both.  
Infants were highly attentive during the initial phases of the familiarization and test trials; 
across conditions, they looked, on average, for 87% of each initial phase. Interobserver 
agreement during the final phase of each trial was calculated for all 40 infants and averaged 92% 
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per trial per infant. Finally, preliminary analyses of the test data revealed no significant 
interaction of condition and event with infant's sex or with which puppet received the first 
cookie, both Fs(1, 32) ≤ 1.55, ps ≥ .222; the data were therefore collapsed across these latter two 
factors in subsequent analyses. 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
Looking times during the final phase of the first familiarization trial (which introduced 
the puppets) were subjected to an ANOVA with condition (experimental or inanimate-control) 
condition as a between-subject factor. This effect was not significant, F(1, 38) = 0.35, p > .250, 
suggesting that infants in the experimental (M = 22.17, SD = 15.67) and inanimate-control (M = 
25.14, SD = 16.32) conditions tended to look equally at the puppets. Looking times during the 
second familiarization trial (which introduced the experimenter and her tray of cookies) were 
analyzed in the same manner. The main effect of condition was now significant, F(1, 38) = 5.83, 
p = .021, indicating that infants in the inanimate-control condition (M = 21.28, SD = 17.75) 
looked significantly longer than those in the experimental condition (M = 11.29, SD = 5.21). It 
could be that infants in the inanimate-control condition found this trial more interesting because 
it involved an animate individual (recall that they had seen only the inanimate puppets in the 
previous trial), or it could be that infants in the experimental condition found this trial less 
interesting because the animated puppets introduced in the first trial were now absent. Either 
way, this finding did not affect our interpretation of the test trial and is not discussed further.  
 Looking times during the final phase of the test trial (Fig. 2) were subjected to an 
ANOVA with condition (experimental or inanimate-control) condition and test event (unequal or 
equal) as between-subjects factors. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of event F(1, 




2 = 0.13 (no such interaction was found in either the first or the second familiarization 
trial, both Fs(1, 36) ≤ 0.16, ps ≥ .250). Planned comparisons revealed that infants in the 
experimental condition looked significantly longer at the unequal (M = 25.05, SD = 9.50) than at 
the equal (M = 12.02, SD = 4.19) event, F(1, 36) = 11.69, p = .002, d = 1.77, whereas infants in 
the inanimate-control condition looked about equally at the unequal (M = 16.02, SD = 9.83) and 
equal (M = 15.57, SD = 9.28) events, F(1, 36) = 0.01, p > .250, d = 0.04. Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests confirmed the results of the experimental (Z = 3.14, p = .002) and inanimate-control (Z = 
0.00, p > .250) conditions. 
 Next, we compared the test responses of the 4-month-olds in Experiment 4 to those of the 
9-month-olds in Experiment 1, using an ANOVA similar to that above but with age as an 
additional between-subject factor. The effect of age was not significant, nor was the Age  
Condition  Event interaction, both Fs(1, 72) ≤ 0.04, ps ≥ .250, suggesting that the two age 
groups responded similarly to the test events they were shown. Because slightly different 
procedures were used at the two ages, however, these negative results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 Lastly, we compared the test responses of 4-month-olds in the experimental condition (N 
= 20) who had (9) or did not have (11) an older sibling. The data were subjected to an ANOVA 
with sibling (yes or no) and event (unequal or equal) as between-subject factors. Neither the 
main effect of sibling nor the Sibling  Event interaction were significant, both Fs(1, 16) ≤ 1.24, 
ps ≥ .250, suggesting that infants responded similarly whether or not they had an older sibling. 
Given the small numbers of participants involved, however, these results should again be 
interpreted with caution. 
 Like the 9-month-olds in Experiment 1, the 4-month-olds in Experiment 4 expected the 
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experimenter to divide the two cookies equally between the two animated puppets, and this 
effect was eliminated when the puppets were inanimate. These results provide the first 
experimental demonstration that sensitivity to fairness can already be observed, at least under 
simple conditions, in the first half-year of life. As such, these results provide strong support for 





















CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present experiments yielded five findings. First, at both 9 (Experiments 1–3) and 4 
(Experiment 4) months of age, infants expected an experimenter to divide two cookies equally 
(1:1) between two similar animated puppets, and they detected a violation when she divided 
them unequally (2:0) instead. Second, infants demonstrated this expectation whether the 
experimenter gave the cookies one by one to the puppets (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or first 
separated them onto two placemats and then gave each puppet a placemat (Experiment 3). Third, 
infants held no particular expectation about the experimenter’s actions when the puppets were 
inanimate (Experiments 1 and 4) or when the experimenter did not distribute the cookies but 
simply lifted covers to reveal them (Experiment 2). Fourth, at both 9 (Experiments 1–3) and 4 
(Experiment 4) months, infants with or without older siblings were equally likely to detect the 
violation in the 2:0 outcome. Finally, when the number of cookies distributed was increased from 
two to four, 9-month-olds failed to detect the violation in the 3:1 outcome (Experiment 3). 
Together, these results confirm and extend prior findings that 10- to 19-month-olds detected a 
violation when shown a 2:0 outcome (Bian et al., 2018; Meristo et al., 2016; Sloane et al., 2012), 
that 12-month-olds failed to detect a violation when shown a 3:1 outcome (Sommerville et al., 
2013; Tatone & Csibra, 2018), and that 9- and 6-month-olds failed to look preferentially at a 3:1 
over a 2:2 outcome when both were presented simultaneously (Ziv & Sommerville, 2017). 
 The evidence reported here that 9- and 4-month-olds consistently detected a 2:0 violation 
provides strong support for the suggestion, from researchers across the social sciences, that the 
“first draft” (Graham et al., 2013) of human moral cognition includes an expectation of fairness 
(e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2015; Baumard, et al., 2013; Bian et al., 2018; Dawes et al., 2007;  
Graham et al., 2013; Jackendoff, 2007; Meristo et al., 2016; Premack, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011; 
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Shweder et al.,, 1997; Sloane et al., 2012). Such an expectation might have gradually evolved in 
our species in part because it represents a cost-effective strategy for reducing the likelihood of 
future negative interactions (e.g., Baumard et al., 2013; Bian et al., 2018; Cosmides & Tooby, 
2013). By adhering to fairness, a distributor avoids having to work out in each and every 
resource-allocation situation that a recipient is likely to be resentful if offered, for no obvious 
reason, less than an equal share of a windfall resource. Over evolutionary time, a genuine 
expectation of fairness could have emerged that bypassed these mentalizing efforts, reduced 
errors, and ultimately benefited the distributor as well as the recipients. From this perspective, it 
would make sense that infants’ concern for fairness would be highly abstract and would be 
brought to bear whenever they saw a distributor divide windfall resources between two similar 
recipients, be they two women, two speaking puppets, or two animated geometric figures with 
eyes (e.g., Meristo et al., 2016; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Slone et al., 2012).  
 At the same time, however, our findings and those of Sommerville and her colleagues 
(e.g., Sommerville et al., 2013; Ziv & Sommerville, 2017; see also Tatone & Csibra, 2017) make 
clear that there are sharp limits in young infants’ ability to detect fairness violations. In 
particular, 9-month-olds are able to detect 2:0 violations, but not 3:1 violations, even when the 
experimenter’s actions toward the recipients are identical (i.e., the experimenter slides a 
placemat toward each recipient). How can we explain these differential results? There are at least 
three possibilities.  
 First, it may be that young infants are able to process distributions that involve two items, 
but not distributions that involve four or more items, due to limitations in their information-
processing capacity (e.g., Diamond, 2013). Thus, when there are two recipients and two items, 
infants can form an expectation about how many items each recipient will get (1:1), and they can 
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compare this expectation to the observed distribution (1:1 or 2:0). When there are four or more 
items, however, this whole process becomes overwhelming, leading to equal looking times at 
equal and unequal distributions. 
 Second, it may be that young infants are able to detect qualitative violations, in which 
one recipient gets something and the other gets nothing (e.g., a 2:0 or a 4:0 violation), but not 
quantitative violations, in which both recipients get something but in differing amounts (e.g., a 
3:1 or a 7:1 violation). For example, infants’ representations of resource-allocation events could 
at first be very sparse: They might simply represent whether each recipient gets any items, rather 
than how many items each recipient gets. Such meager representations would enable infants to 
detect qualitative violations, but not quantitative violations. (The physical-reasoning literature 
presents many examples of event representations that are initially sparse and become 
progressively richer as infants identify relevant features that help better predict outcomes; for 
reviews, see Baillargeon, Li, Gertner, & Wu, 2011; Baillargeon, Li, Ng, & Yuan, 2009). 
 Finally, it may be that young infants can detect quantitative violations, but only when the 
amounts allocated to the two recipients are markedly different. In this view, infants would 
succeed when the numerical distance between the two amounts is larger (e.g., a 7:1 violation), 
but not when it is smaller (e.g., a 3:1 violation). With experience, infants would come to more 
precisely represent the amounts allocated to the two recipients and hence would begin to detect a 
deviation from fairness even in a 3:1 violation. 
 Which (if any) of the preceding possibilities might be correct? Can prior findings on 
when infants first begin to detect 3:1 violations help us distinguish between them?  It is not clear 
that this is the case. In particular, consider the finding that 12–15-month-olds with older siblings 
looked significantly longer at a 3:1 than at a 2:2 outcome when the two were presented 
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simultaneously (Ziv & Sommerville, 2017). These findings could be taken to suggest that, due to 
greater opportunities to represent and compare allocations in everyday life, infants with older 
siblings (a) are better at processing distributions with more than two items, (b) are faster at 
learning to attend not only to whether recipients get something but also to how many items they 
get, and/or (c) are more adept at precisely representing and comparing how many items 
recipients get. Future research can bear on these issues by examining whether young infants 
would succeed in detecting more extreme quantitative violations, such as a 5:1 or 7:1 violation. 
If yes, such results would tend to cast doubt on the first and second possibilities listed above and 
to support the third possibility instead. Such results would also dovetail well with recent findings 
that preschoolers sometimes perform poorly in first- and third-party fairness tasks due to 
cognitive limitations in their ability to encode and remember exact numerical information  (e.g., 
Chernyak & Blake, 2017; Chernyak, Harris, & Cordes, in press; Chernyak, Sandham, Harris, & 
Cordes, 2016).  
7.1. Prior Findings with Young Infants  
 As noted above, the positive results obtained with 9- and 4-month-olds in the present 
one-distributor tasks confirm and extend those previously obtained with 10-month-olds (Meristo 
et al., 2016). The present results also fit well with the finding that 10-month-olds (a) looked 
significantly longer when an informed bystander rewarded an unfair as opposed to a fair 
distributor, but (b) looked about equally when an uninformed bystander (whose view was 
blocked during the distributors’ actions) rewarded either distributor (Meristo & Surian, 2013). At 
the same time, however, our results and those just cited are inconsistent with a few other findings 
with young infants mentioned in the Introduction. 
One such finding was that after watching a fair and an unfair distributor divide two items 
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between two recipients, 10-month-olds did not show a preference for the fair distributor (Geraci 
& Surian, 2011). Given the extensive evidence that infants in the first year of life prefer 
individuals who act positively over individuals who act negatively (e.g., Hamlin, 2013a; Hamlin 
et al., 2007; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011), it is unlikely that infants failed to prefer the fair distributor 
because they were too young to show such affiliative preferences. Rather, it is more likely that 
details about the task made it too difficult for young infants to process. In particular, the task 
involved five kinds of animal characters. To start, a bear or a lion (the distributor) stood alone at 
the center of the computer monitor, near two allocation items. Next, a chicken (an observer) 
entered the scene, brought the items closer to the distributor, and then rested at the bottom of the 
monitor. Next, a donkey and a cow (the recipients) entered one at a time and took positions in the 
top two corners of the monitor. Finally, the distributor divided the two items between the 
recipients, either equally (e.g., the bear) or unequally (e.g., the lion). Given this fairly complex 
cast of characters, infants might simply have had difficulty remembering who played what role 
in the events, due to their limited information-processing capacity. Future research can examine 
whether young infants might be more likely to succeed if shown simpler events involving a fair 
distributor (e.g., a bear), an unfair distributor (e.g., a lion), and two similar recipients (e.g., two 
donkeys). Given the present results, we would predict that even young infants would prefer the 
fair over the unfair distributor.  
 The other inconsistent findings were that after watching a fair and an unfair distributor 
divide two items between two similar recipients, 10-month-olds looked significantly longer when 
a newcomer either rewarded or punished the unfair as opposed to the fair distributor (Meristo & 
Surian, 2013, 2014). One possible explanation for these results is that because infants could form 
no particular expectations about the newcomer’s actions (recall that the newcomer was entirely 
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absent during the distributor’s actions), their responses were guided primarily by  a vigilance or 
negativity bias (e.g., Baltazar et al., 2012; DesChamps et al., 2015; Kinzler & Shutts, 2008; 
Vaish et al., 2008). Specifically, infants looked longer whenever the newcomer approached the 






















CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
In four experiments using one-distributor tasks, 9- and 4-month-olds detected a violation 
when shown an unfair 2:0 outcome. In contrast, 9-month-olds failed to detect a violation when 
shown an unfair 3:1 outcome. Together, these results suggest two broad conclusions. First, they 
support claims that an abstract expectation of fairness is a part of the basic structure of human 
moral cognition. Second, at the same time, they also point to sharp limitations in young infants’ 
ability to detect deviations from fairness. The present results thus pave the way for future 
investigations of how numerical accuracy and other cognitive factors may contribute to the 
development of early expectations about fairness in infancy and beyond. 
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CHAPTER 9: FIGURES 
Fig.1. Schematic depiction of the events shown in the experimental condition (A) and the 






Fig. 2. Mean looking times at the unequal and equal events during the final phase of the test trial 
in the various conditions of Experiments 1–4. The errors bars represent standard errors, and each 












Fig. 3. Schematic depiction of the events shown in the cover-experimental condition (A) and the 






Fig. 4. Schematic depiction of the events shown in the two-item condition (A) and the four-item 







Fig. 5. Schematic depiction of the events shown in the shown in the experimental condition (A) 
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